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DO WE EVEN NEED A TEST? 
A REEVALUATION OF ASSESSING 
SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY IN A 
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT CASE 
Nicole K. Roodhuyzen*
INTRODUCTION 
 The task of proving that one creative work is similar enough 
to another creative work so as to constitute copyright 
infringement may be even more difficult than creating the work 
in the first place. The improper appropriation1 analysis, for both 
courts and litigants, is one of the most contentious and least 
precisely defined inquires in copyright law.2 There are multiple 
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sisters, Erin Roodhuyzen and Jasmine Wright; Grandma, Wigay Wix and 
Nancy Wright for their constant love and support.  She would also like to 
thank Mark O’Sullivan and her friends who provided support and 
encouragement throughout this process. She would also like to express 
gratitude to Professor Beryl Jones-Woodin, Professor Aliza Kaplan, David 
Kaye, Heather Maly and the members of the Journal of Law and Policy for 
all their help and hard work in creating this final product. 
1 “Improper appropriation” in this context refers to copying prohibited 
by §§ 106(1) and 106(2) of the Copyright Act. Courts often use this 
terminology when assessing claims for infringement of the reproduction right, 
§ 106(1) and the derivative work right, § 106(2). In a two-part inquiry, 
courts will first consider whether the defendant copied-in-fact or “copied” the 
plaintiff’s work. They will then assess whether the defendant also engaged in 
“improper appropriation” or “infringing copying” in violation of, for 
example, § 106(1). See JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL 
INFORMATION ECONOMY 323 (2nd ed. 2006). 
2 CRAIG JOYCE, MARSHALL LEAFFER, PETER JASZI & TYLER T. OCHOA, 
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tests for copyright infringement and the analysis is often 
complicated and elusive.3 Nevertheless, plaintiffs continue to file 
suits claiming that their creative works have been infringed and 
courts must establish effective ways to determine whether the 
works are similar enough to rise to the level of improper 
appropriation. 
A plaintiff who feels that her work has been infringed upon 
by a similar work must demonstrate to the court that the 
similarity constitutes infringement under federal copyright law.4 
If a court decides that the works are similar, it is often difficult 
to determine whether the court applied a test to reach its 
conclusion or rather utilized a test to explain the perceived 
similarity.5 At times, it may seem like courts are going by an “I 
know it when I see it” means to determine similarity.6
There is a great amount of confusion among courts and 
commentators as to what the proper test is for determining 
whether two works are “substantially similar” so as to constitute 
copyright infringement. The various tests currently available are 
ultimately supposed to further the underlying goal of copyright 
law, which is to “promote the Progress of Science and useful 
COPYRIGHT LAW 692 (6th ed. 2003). 
3 Robert Bernstein & Robert W. Clarida, ‘Ay There’s the Rug,’ 
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 19, 2003, at 3. 
4 See B. MacPaul Stanfield, Note, Finding the Fact of Familiarity: 
Assessing Judicial Similarity Tests in Copyright Infringement Actions, 49 
DRAKE L. REV. 489, 492 (2001). 
5 Id. It is possible that the tests currently articulated by the Circuits  
are not a means to determine similarity, but rather a means to 
explain a finding of similarity that is determined in such a way 
that defies clear explanation . . . . The confusing array of tests 
is not merely a means to prove similarity; it provides a lexicon 
to explain what is similar, the extent of similarity, and whether 
the similarity constitutes copyright infringement. 
Id. at 512. 
6 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) 
(stating with regard to a definition of pornography and obscenity: “I shall not 
today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be 
embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never 
succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it . . . .”). 
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Arts.”7 Thus, courts are ultimately supposed to establish 
incentives for the creation of artistic works. 
However, despite the uniform policy underlying copyright 
law, courts have created a variety of conflicting and often times 
confusing tests. Currently, there are two main tests that most 
courts follow: (1) the ordinary observer test associated with the 
Second Circuit and (2) the Ninth Circuit’s extrinsic/intrinsic test. 
Some courts utilize the abstraction/filtration/comparison test, 
while others use variations or a combination of each of these 
tests. 
In addition to the confusion about what test should be used, 
the tests that have been articulated by the circuits are 
complicated and vague.8 Compounding the problem, courts 
frequently apply the tests inconsistently and incorrectly.9 As a 
result, decisions in copyright infringement cases are 
unpredictable and often seem ad hoc.10 As the tests become 
increasingly elusive for both courts and litigants, it is important 
to consider whether there should be one single test articulated by 
the Supreme Court, or rather, whether there should be a test at 
all. 
It is therefore important to examine and critique the myriad 
of tests currently available to determine whether two works are 
substantially similar, and to articulate an approach more aligned 
with the underlying policies of copyright law. 
Part I of this Note will briefly review the history and 
purpose of copyright law. Part II will present an overview of the 
origin of substantial similarity in copyright infringement cases. 
Part III examines the different approaches articulated by the 
circuits to assess substantial similarity. While this examination is 
lengthy, it is necessary to effectuate the solution proffered by 
7 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
8 Jarrod M. Mohler, Comment, Toward a Better Understanding of 
Substantial Similarity in Copyright Infringement Cases, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 
971, 972 (2000). 
9 Id. 
10 Jeannette R. Busek, Comment, Copyright Infringement: A Proposal 
for a New Standard for Substantial Similarity Based on the Degree of 
Possible Expressive Variation, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1777, 1778 (1998). 
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this Note. Finally, Part IV proposes that courts should cease 
attempting to create a single test for substantial similarity. 
Proving similarity and infringement is not amenable to a one-
size-fits-all test, especially given the many categories of 
expressions and types of media that are protected by 
copyright.11 Instead of trying to wade through the confusing 
array of tests available or attempting to articulate a single test, 
courts should articulate a standard that goes to the ultimate 
purpose of copyright law. Thus, in order to determine if there 
has been copyright infringement, a court should determine 
whether or not providing relief for the owner of the copyright 
will enhance the policy goals of copyright law and the objectives 
of Congress. 
I.  COPYRIGHT LAW IN GENERAL 
The following sections will discuss the policy considerations 
underlying federal copyright law and the elements that are 
required in order for a plaintiff to bring an action for copyright 
infringement. 
A.  General Policy Considerations Behind Copyright Law 
The United States Constitution empowered Congress to 
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing 
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”12 The current 
governing statue enacted by Congress is the Copyright Act of 
1976.13 Copyright protection is extended to “authors”14 for any 
11 Stanfield, supra note 4, at 512. 
12 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
13 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541. The first 
copyright law, enacted by Congress in 1790, provided for two 14-year terms 
of protection and was entitled: “An act for the encouragement of learning.” 
COHEN, ET AL., supra note 1, at 22 (quoting Copyright Act of 1790, 1st 
Cong., 2d Sess., ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790)). In 1909, the Copyright Act 
underwent an overhaul, including revisions to the categories of works 
protected by the law and an extension of the term of copyright protection. 
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“original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression”15 for a given period of time.16 Works that come 
within the scope of the Copyright Act are afforded strong 
protections, for example “the Act specifies in detail the kinds of 
works that are protected and for how long; creates protection 
even without registration or notice; assigns exclusive rights and 
allows for transfer and division of ownership and rights; and 
creates various remedies including damages and fines.”17
While Congress provided a benefit to a copyright holder in 
granting specific exclusive rights to uses pertaining to 
reproduction, preparation of derivative works, distribution, and 
public performances and displays of the work,18 the primary 
COHEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 24-26. The 1976 Copyright was enacted as a 
result of the emergence of new technologies and the perceived inadequacies 
of the 1909 Act. Id. at 27. While the 1976 Act has undergone changes since 
it took effect on January 1, 1978, it provides the basic structure for copyright 
law in the United States today. Id. 
14 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (“Copyright in a work protected under this title 
vests initially in the author or authors of the work.”). 
15 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
16 Id. Jason Mazzone has also opined: 
To the benefit of authors, Congress has taken a liberal view of 
its constitutional power to afford protection for ‘limited Times.’ 
In the very first copyright statute, the period of copyright lasted 
just fourteen years, renewable for an additional fourteen years. 
As a result of the amendments to the 1976 Act made by the 
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, copyright in works 
created on or after January 1, 1978 now lasts for the life of the 
author plus seventy years. 
Jason Mazzone, Copyfraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1026 (2006) (citations 
omitted). 
17 Mazzone, supra note 16. 
18 17 U.S.C. § 106. The exclusive rights of a copyright owner are set 
forth in § 106 of the Copyright Act: 
Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright 
under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize 
any of the following: 
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or 
phonorecords; 
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted 
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purpose of copyright law is to benefit the public.19 As a result, 
courts are forced to deal with two conflicting public policy 
factors. On one side “the law seeks to encourage new authors by 
protecting their works” and on the other “the law does not want 
to give any one author a monopoly over an idea so as to 
foreclose future authors from building on that idea.”20 Thus, 
courts are left with the difficult task of encouraging creativity by 
affording authors the opportunity to reap the benefits of their 
creative works, while simultaneously permitting future authors 
to create new works by expanding upon the ideas of others.21
In order to effect the constitutional goal of “promot[ing] the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts,”22 copyright legislation 
“assures authors the right to their original expression, but 
encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information 
work; 
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work 
to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by 
rental, lease, or lending; 
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic 
works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual 
works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; 
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic 
works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, 
including the individual images of a motion picture or other 
audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly and; 
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted 
work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission. Id. 
19 Stanfield, supra note 4, at 493. 
20 Busek, supra note 10, at 1777-78. 
21 Mohler, supra note 8, at 974; see also Warner Bros. Inc. v. American 
Broadcasting Companies, 720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating that “[i]t 
is a fundamental objective of copyright law to foster creativity. However, that 
law has the capacity both to augment and diminish the prospects for 
creativity. By assuring the author of an original work the exclusive benefits 
of whatever commercial success his or her work enjoys, the law obviously 
promotes creativity. At the same time, it can deter the creation of new works 
if authors are fearful that their creations will too readily be found to be 
substantially similar to preexisting works.”). 
22  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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conveyed by a work.”23 Thus, it is a fundamental precept of 
copyright law that ideas and facts are not protected—only the 
expression of an idea can be protected.24 This distinction has the 
purpose of defining the line between what can be protected by 
copyright law and what should remain in the public domain.25
But, making the distinction between idea and expression is 
often difficult.26 In Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., Judge 
Learned Hand provided the following guidance: 
Upon a work . . . a great number of patterns 
increasingly fit equally well, as more and more of the 
incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more 
than the most general statement of what the [work] is 
about, and at times consist only of its title; but there 
is a point in this series of abstraction where they are 
no longer protected, since otherwise the [author] 
could prevent the use of his “ideas” to which, apart 
from their expression, his property is never 
extended.27
23 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 
(1991). 
24 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 207 (1954); see also 17 U.S.C. § 
102(b) (asserting that “[i]n no case does copyright protection for an original 
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method 
of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in 
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”). 
25 COHEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 72. 
26 See id. at 74, 80. 
27 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). This is what many commentators 
and courts call the “abstractions test.” While this test has  
received continuous use by courts in copyright infringement cases, 
it has also been criticized by courts and commentators as not being 
at “test” at all . . . . The abstractions test, in reality, is just a 
restatement of general policy that copyright law protects the 
expression of ideas but not the ideas themselves. The test provides 
no further guidance or insight into which works should be 
protected. Thus, although courts often cite the test as reasoning for 
their decisions, such citations ultimately fail to explain the 
underlying reason why courts decide copyright cases as they do. 
Busek, supra note 10, at 1789 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
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In Nichols, Hand articulated a standard that is not so much a 
way for courts to perceive similarity but rather a means to 
separate ideas from the expression of those ideas.28  
This idea-expression dichotomy plays an important role in 
ultimately determining whether a copyrighted work has been 
infringed. Federal copyright law endeavors to strike the proper 
balance between protecting an author’s expression of an idea and 
encouraging the idea itself.29 As a result, courts must address 
what is similar about two works and if the only similarity shared 
is similar ideas, then there has been no infringement.30 The 
court must determine whether there are similarities in expression 
between two works, and if similarities in expression do exist, 
whether they cross a threshold of similarity that constitutes 
copyright infringement. 
The distinction between ideas and expression is a source of 
great confusion for courts and litigants. Unfortunately, there is 
no bright line rule as to what constitutes an idea and what 
constitutes an expression of that idea. As such, courts must 
engage in a delicate balancing between idea and expression when 
assessing whether two works are substantially similar so as to 
constitute copyright infringement. 
A major concern with courts providing too much protection 
when making distinctions between idea and expression is that 
eventually nothing would be left in the public domain and 
incentives to create new works would vanish because an author 
would find it difficult not to infringe upon previous authors’ 
works.31 Unfortunately, the tests currently available to assess 
substantial similarity do not provide courts with adequate 
guidance on making these difficult distinctions between what is 
protectible and what is unprotectible. 
Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1540 (7th Cir. 1990)). 
28 Stanfield, supra note 4, at 500. 
29 Busek, supra note 10, at 1778. 
30 Warner Bros. Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir. 
1983) (stating that “[t]he similarity to be assessed must concern the 
expression of ideas, not the ideas themselves.”). 
31 Mohler, supra note 8, at 974. 
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B.  Elements of a Copyright Infringement Claim 
A plaintiff bringing a claim for copyright infringement must 
prove two elements: (1) ownership of a valid copyright and (2) 
that defendant violated one of the exclusive rights under section 
106 of the Copyright Act (e.g., the right to reproduce the 
copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords, §106(1), or the 
right to prepare derivative works, §106(2)).32 In general, with 
respect to the first element, the copyright registration certificate 
serves as prima facie evidence for the plaintiff that a valid 
copyright exists.33 With respect to the second element, for 
claims of violations of the right to reproduce the work, §106(1), 
the plaintiff must prove “copying of the constituent elements of 
the work that are original.”34
Proof of copying consists of two separate components.35 
First, there is the issue of whether copying occurred.36 Next, 
there is the issue of whether such copying is actionable (i.e. 
32 COHEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 314. “Notably absent from this 
formulation of the prima facie case is damage or any harm to plaintiff 
resulting from the infringement.” Nimmer on Copyright § 13.01, 4-13 
[hereinafter Nimmer]. 
33 See Nimmer § 13.01[A]. 
34 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 
(1991). 
35 See Nimmer § 13.01[B]. 
36 Id. (stating that “[i]t is generally not possible to establish copying as a 
factual matter by direct evidence, as it is rare that the plaintiff has available a 
witness to the physical act of copying . . . . Therefore, copying is ordinarily 
established indirectly by the plaintiff’s proof of access and substantial 
similarity . . . . [I]n the previous formulation, the term ‘substantial similarity’ 
[should] be discarded in favor of ‘probative similarity.’ In other words, when 
the question is copying as a factual matter, then similarities that, in the 
normal course of events, would not be expected to arise independently if the 
two works are probative of defendant’s having copied as a factual matter 
from plaintiff’s work . . . . [D]espite proof of access and probative 
similarity, the trier of fact may be upheld in finding no copying if such trier 
believes the defendant’s evidence is an independent creation, except where 
the similarity between the two works is such that no explanation other than 
copying is reasonably possible.”). 
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whether there was too much copying).37 A plaintiff must 
demonstrate both copying and too much copying in order to 
prevail.38 Therefore, even where a defendant concedes copying, 
no legal consequences will follow unless the court determines 
that the copying is substantial.39 In order to establish that there 
has been too much copying, or improper appropriation, a 
plaintiff must show that there is substantial similarity between 
the plaintiff’s work and defendant’s work.40
II.  SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY: AN OVERVIEW 
Substantial similarity is a concept that is mystifying for both 
courts and litigants.41 In order for an appropriation to be 
actionable, a plaintiff must demonstrate that defendant’s work is 
substantially similar to plaintiff’s work such that defendant is 
liable for copyright infringement.42 Substantial similarity is a 
conclusion; it is not a formula or a test.43
It is the task of the court to determine whether the 
defendant’s copying is sufficient to constitute infringement. The 
scope of works that copyright law protects is very broad: from 
literary works, including books, movies and poems, to 
sculptures, paintings and photographs, to musical works and 
computer programs.44 In attempting to cover such a variety of 
37 See id. 
38 See id. (explaining that “copying as a factual matter is insufficient if 
improper appropriation is lacking. Conversely, even when two works are 
substantially similar with respect to protectible expression, if the defendant 
did not copy as a factual matter, but instead independently created the work 
at issue, then infringement liability must be denied.”). 
39 See id. § 13.03[A]. 
40 See id. 
41 See Eric C. Osterberg, The Meaning and Significance of Substantial 
Similarity, 863 PLI/PAT 23, 28 (2006). 
42 See Nimmer § 13.01[B]. 
43 Osterberg, supra note 41, at 29. 
44 The statutory coverage of copyright law provides that: 
[w]orks of authorship include the following categories: (1) 
literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying 
words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; 
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works, the current standards for assessing substantial similarity 
adopted by courts are unclear, with results that are “inevitably 
ad hoc.”45
Currently, there is a split in the circuit courts regarding 
which test is proper for assessing whether protectible elements 
in a work are substantially similar in a copyright infringement 
claim.46 Courts continually attempt to fashion and re-work tests 
in an effort to reduce the amount of confusion and clarify the 
notion of substantial similarity. However, these efforts have 
ultimately led to more confusion and ambiguity about the 
appropriate standard for determining whether two works are 
substantial similar.47
There are two primary tests that most courts follow: the 
“ordinary observer” test associated with the Second Circuit or 
the two-part “extrinsic/intrinsic” test associated with the Ninth 
Circuit.48 The “ordinary observer” test adopted by the Second 
Circuit asks “whether an average lay observer would recognize 
the alleged copy as having been appropriated from the 
copyrighted work.”49 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit has adopted 
an alternative two-part test that includes an objective extrinsic 
test and a subjective intrinsic test.50 On the extrinsic prong the 
court engages in an objective comparison of specific expressive 
elements whereas on the subjective intrinsic prong the court 
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, 
and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and audiovisual works; 
(7) sound recordings; (8) architectural works. 
17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
45 Busek, supra note 10, at 1778-79 (quoting Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. 
Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960)). 
46 ROBERT C. OSTERBERG AND ERIC C. OSTERBERG, SUBSTANTIAL 
SIMILARITY IN COPYRIGHT LAW § 3, at 3-2 (Practicing Law Institute 2003) 
[hereinafter, OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG]. 
47 See Busek, supra note 10, at 1779. 
48 Murray Hill Publ’n, Inc. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 361 
F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Nimmer § 13.03(E)(3). 
49 Knitwaves, Inc v Lollytogs, Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1002 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(quoting Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer Cal., 937 F.2d 759, 766 (2d Cir. 
1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
50 See Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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focuses on the total concept and feel of the two works.51
While most courts use either the Second Circuit’s “ordinary 
observer test”52 or the Ninth Circuit’s “extrinsic/intrinsic test”53 
there are some variations. For example, the Tenth Circuit uses 
the abstraction/filtration/comparison test and the Sixth Circuit 
and the D.C. Circuit use a variation of this test.54 The Eleventh 
Circuit uses a test that is similar to the tests used by the Second 
and Ninth Circuit before they diverged.55
All of these tests have their merits and their faults. While 
they seem sound in theory, in reality, courts inconsistently apply 
them.56 This inconsistency has led to confusion and 
unpredictability for courts and litigants as to where to draw the 
line between protectible and unprotectible material. None of the 
tests currently available provide a clear analytical framework. 
Additionally, none of the existing tests provide hard and fast 
rules for courts and litigants to follow.57 The following sections 
attempt to bring clarity to this confusion by conducting a 
thorough examination of the various tests available for assessing 
substantial similarity. 
51 See Cavalier v. Random House, 297 F.3d 815, 822 (9th Cir. 2002). 
52 The circuits that follow the ordinary observer test are the First 
Circuit, the Third Circuit, the Fifth Circuit, and the Seventh Circuit. 
OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3, at 3-2. 
53 The circuits that follow the extrinsic/intrinsic test model are the 
Fourth Circuit and the Eighth Circuit. See id. 
54 OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3, at 3-2. 
55 Id. 
56 See Mohler, supra note 8, at 972. 
57 It is certainly debatable whether it is better to have clear rules or, 
rather, concepts and principles that people can use to regulate their lives. The 
difficulty with clear rules is they are often over or under inclusive; whereas, 
the difficulty with concepts and principles is that they are often unclear and it 
is difficult for people to regulate their lives with certainty. 
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III.  CIRCUIT SPLITS: THE DIFFERENT APPROACHES FOR 
ASSESSING SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY 
This section will examine the numerous tests available for 
assessing substantial similarity. First, this section will examine 
the “ordinary observer” test articulated by the Second Circuit 
followed by an analysis of the courts that follow the Second 
Circuit. Next, the “extrinsic/intrinsic” test associated with the 
Ninth Circuit will be analyzed followed by an assessment of the 
courts that follow the Ninth Circuit. Finally, this section will 
address the tests utilized by the remaining circuits, including the 
Abstraction/Filtration/Comparison test. 
A.  The Second Circuit’s Ordinary Observer Test 
The Second Circuit’s test for assessing substantial similarity 
in a copyright infringement case is the “ordinary observer” 
test.58 In Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weinder Corp., a 
58 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (holding that in 
order to establish infringement, a plaintiff must prove both “(a) that 
defendant copied from plaintiff’s copyrighted work and (b) that the copying 
(assuming it to be proved) went too far as to constitute improper 
appropriation.”). Further, 
The copyright infringement test in the Second Circuit is a step-
by-step process. First, the court determines whether the 
defendant copied from the plaintiff. In cases where the defendant 
denies copying, the court tests to see whether the defendant had 
access to plaintiff’s work at the time defendant prepared his 
work, and whether there is sufficient similarity between the 
works to prove copying. The Second Circuit has clarified that 
the correct term for this threshold determination of similarity is 
“probative similarity” rather than “substantial similarity.” On 
the probative similarity issue, “analytic dissection” is 
appropriate and the testimony of experts may be received to aid 
the trier of facts . . . . If the court determines that there has 
been copying, then only does there arise the second issue, that 
of illicit copying “unlawful appropriation.” The court must then 
determine whether defendant’s taking is sufficient to constitute 
infringement. It is that part of the inquiry that is the “substantial 
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case involving the alleged infringement of a design printed on 
cloth, used to make women’s dresses, Judge Learned Hand 
articulated that there is substantial similarity where “the ordinary 
observer, unless set out to detect the disparities, would be 
disposed to overlook them, and regard their aesthetic appeal as 
the same.”59
More recently, in Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs, a case 
involving the infringement of plaintiff’s copyrighted squirrel and 
leaf children’s sweater designs, the Second Circuit stated that the 
ordinary observer test asks whether “an average lay observer 
would recognize the alleged copy as having been appropriated 
from the copyrighted work.”60 In making this assessment, courts 
examine the works’ “total concept and feel.”61
The Second Circuit allows the use of expert testimony on the 
issue of whether there was copying, but does not allow the use 
of expert testimony on the issue of whether there was too much 
copying (utilizing a substantial similarity analysis).62 In Arnstein 
v. Porter, the plaintiff, Ira B. Arnstein, brought an action 
similarity” test. 
OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:1.1, at 3-3. 
59 Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weinder Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 
(2d Cir. 1960). 
60 Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1002 (2d Cir. 1995). 
61 Knitwaves, Inc., 71 F.3d at 1003. 
The total concept and feel test has . . . . been strongly 
criticized. Rather than clarifying what substantial similarity 
means, total concept and feel actually makes the inquiry even 
murkier. [N]o one knows what concept and feel means, and no 
court that uses the test has attempted to define the terms. 
Moreover, the test is problematic because it is contrary to the 
specific language of section 102(b) of the Copyright Act which 
clearly states that [i]n no case does copyright protection . . . 
extend to any . . . concept. 
Busek, supra note 10, at 1803 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(citing Matthew M. Fortnow, Note, Why the “Look and Feel” of Computer 
Software Should Note Receive Copyright Protection, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 
421, 425 (1992); 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)). 
62 Further discussion of the Circuit’s split regarding the use of expert 
testimony in assessing substantial similarity follows later in this Note at 
Section III.D. 
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against Cole Porter for infringement of the copyright to his 
musical compositions.63 The court in Arnstein justified the 
ordinary observer test being applied on the issue of assessing 
substantial similarity without any analytic dissection or expert 
opinion.64 The judge rationalized that “[t]he plaintiff’s legally 
protected interest is not, as such, his reputation as a musician 
but his interest in the potential financial returns from his 
compositions which derive from the lay public’s approbation of 
his efforts.”65 The question, therefore, is “whether defendant 
took from plaintiff’s work so much of what is pleasing to the 
ears of lay listeners, who comprise the audience for whom such 
popular music is composed, that defendant wrongfully 
appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff.”66
Since its creation, the ordinary observer test has been 
criticized and as will be discussed later in this Note, this test has 
become a source of confusion and frustration as courts struggle 
to determine whether works should be evaluated from the 
viewpoint of the ordinary observer or as the above quote from 
Arnstein suggests, from the viewpoint of the intended 
audience.67
One important concern with regard to courts in the Second 
Circuit allowing expert testimony on the issue of copying but not 
on the issue of too much copying is whether it is possible for 
courts to do this in reality.68 As one court noted: 
[T]he distinction between the two parts of the 
Arnstein test may be of doubtful value when the 
63 154 F.2d at 468. 
64 Id. (finding that on the issue of “illicit copying (unlawful 
appropriation) . . . the test is the response of the ordinary lay hearer; 
accordingly, on that issue, ‘dissection’ and expert testimony are irrelevant”). 
65 Id. at 473. 
66 Id. 
67 Osterberg, supra note 41, at 29. 
68 It is possible that when courts describe similarities, they are getting 
that information from expert testimony that was allowed on the question of 
copying but then prohibited on the question of whether the two works were 
substantially similar. See Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 
797 F.2d 1222, 1232-33 (3d Cir. 1986). 
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finder of fact is the same person for each step: that 
person has been exposed to expert evidence in the 
first step, yet she or he is supposed to ignore or 
“forget” that evidence in analyzing the problem under 
the second step. Especially in complex cases, we 
doubt that the forgetting can be effective when the 
expert testimony is essential to even the most 
fundamental understanding of the objects in 
question.69
Thus, the Arnstein limitation may be more theoretical than 
practical.70 The other circuit courts have conflicting views on 
whether expert testimony may be utilized in assisting the fact 
finder with the substantial similarity analysis. The allowance or 
prohibition of expert testimony is one more confusing and 
controversial aspects of the current state of the circuit courts’ 
analyses of substantial similarity. 
In the Second Circuit, both the issue of whether there was 
copying and the issue of whether there was too much copying 
(unlawful appropriation) are issues of fact for the jury.71 
However, a court may determine “noninfringement as a matter 
of law on a motion for summary judgment either when the 
similarity concerns only noncopyrightable elements72 of 
plaintiff’s work, or when no reasonable trier of fact could find 
the works substantially similar.”73
69 Id. 
70 Michael Der Manuelian, Note, The Role of the Expert Witness in the 
Music Copyright Infringement Cases, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 127, 145 (1988). 
71 Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 469. 
72 Alexandra DeNeve argues that: 
Uncopyrightable elements include but are not limited to: (a) 
Ideas (copyright protects expression not ideas) (b) Systems or 
methods of operation ‘regardless of the form in which it is 
described explained, illustrated or embodied’ (see § 102) (c) 
Historical facts . . . (d) General facts . . . (e) Concepts (f) 
Character names (protected by trademark) (g) Undeveloped 
characters described in words (h) Scenes a faire. 
Alexandra N. DeNeve, Copyright Infringement Litigation, 871 PLI/PAT 89 
(July 2006). 
73 Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1986) 
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A common criticism of the ordinary observer test is that “it 
assumes the reaction of an ordinary observer, when asked 
whether two works strike him or her as substantially similar, is 
an accurate guide to determining if the protected expression of a 
work has been copied rather than its ideas.”74 Other critics have 
argued “that the ordinary observer test creates an overly naïve 
and unsophisticated standard that is inappropriate for deciding 
the often subtle question of distinguishing similarity of ideas 
from similarity of expression.”75 Additionally, when the works 
at issue are particularly complex such as computer programs or 
musical works, the ordinary observer test does not work and is a 
source of confusion and frustration for courts and litigants 
alike.76
B.  Circuits That Follow that Second Circuit’s Ordinary 
Observer Test 
1.  The First Circuit 
The First Circuit follows the Second Circuit and uses the 
ordinary observer test to assess substantial similarity but its 
treatment of the substantial similarity issue does little to clarify 
the confusion.77 In Segrets, Inc. v. Gillman Knitwear Co., a 
(citing Warner Bros. v. Am. Broad. Co., 720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1983). 
74 Howard B. Abrams, Copying of Protected Expression—The Second 
Circuit and the “Ordinary Lay Observer” test, 2 THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 
14:23 (Database updated October 2006). 
75 Id. 
76 See Whelan v. Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc. 797 
F.2d 1222, 1232-33 (3d Cir. 1986); see also Abrams, supra note 74. 
77 OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:1.2, at 3-9; see also 
Segrets, Inc. v. Gillman Knitware Co., 207 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2000); 
Concrete Mach. Co., v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc. 843 F.2d 600 (1st 
Cir. 1988); O’Neill v. Dell Pub. Co., 630 F.2d 685 (1st Cir. 1980)). The 
First Circuit requires courts to first determine whether there was copying. 
Once copying is shown, by direct evidence, proof of access and probative (or 
substantial) similarity, the court then determines whether there has been 
unlawful appropriation of the original work by determining whether the 
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clothier successfully sued a competitor for infringement of the 
clothier’s copyrighted designs for women’s sweaters.78 In 
determining that the competitor’s design for women’s sweater 
was substantially similar to the plaintiff’s design, the court stated 
that the inquiry is “whether the accused work is so similar to the 
plaintiff’s work that an ordinary reasonable person would 
conclude that the defendant unlawfully appropriated the 
plaintiff’s protectible expression by taking material of substance 
and value.”79
Generally, expert testimony is not permitted to aid in the 
substantial similarity inquiry.80 On summary judgment, courts in 
the First Circuit utilize the ordinary observer test to determine 
substantial similarity.81 Courts may grant summary judgment to 
a defendant when “the only finding that could be reached by a 
fact finder, correctly applying the applicable legal standard, is 
that there is no ‘substantial similarity’ between the two 
works.”82
The First Circuit’s analysis generally is consistent with that 
of the Second Circuit and as such has the same difficulties 
discussed earlier in this Note.83 Additionally, as evidenced in 
Segrets, the ordinary observer test is subject to arbitrary line 
drawing by the court when asked to determine how many 
variations or alterations of the plaintiff’s work by the defendant 
are sufficient to preclude a finding of substantial similarity.84
copying was enough to establish substantial similarity of the two works. 
OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:1.2, at 3-9. 
78 207 F.3d at 62. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 66 n.11. 
81 See id. at 62; see also Concrete Mach. Co., 843 F.2d at 611. 
82 O’Neill v. Dell Pub. Co., Inc., 630 F.2d 685 (1st Cir. 1980). 
83 See section III.A of this Note. 
84 See 207 F.3d at 65-66 (stating that “[s]light or trivial variations 
between works will not preclude a finding of infringement under the ordinary 
observer test . . . . At times, the existence of only minor differences may 
itself suggest copying, indicating that the infringer attempted to avoid liability 
by contributing only trivial variations. This is not to suggest that an artist 
cannot avoid infringement by intentionally making substantial alterations in 
the design of a copyrighted work so as to provide a substantially different 
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2.  The Third Circuit 
The Third Circuit also follows the Second Circuit in their 
evaluation of substantial similarity.85 In Dam Things From 
Denmark v. Russ Berrie & Co., a Danish owner of copyrights in 
troll dolls sought to preliminarily enjoin a United States 
competitor from infringing its copyrights.86 Although the court 
did not consider the infringement analysis because the defendant 
conceded infringement, the court stated that in order to prove 
substantial similarity or unlawful appropriation, the fact finder 
determines whether an ordinary lay observer would decide that 
the works were substantially similar.87
expression of the idea embodied in the copyrighted work.”); see also 
Concrete Mach. Co., 843 F.2d at 608 (quoting Nimmer on Copyright § 
13.03[B], at 13-43) (citations omitted) (holding that only when “the points of 
dissimilarity not only exceed the points of similarity, but indicate that the 
remaining points of similarity are (within the context of plaintiff’s work) of 
minimal importance either quantitatively or qualitatively, [that] no 
infringement results.”).
85 OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:1.1, at 3-3; see also R. 
Kay Berry, Inc. v. Taylor Gifts, Inc., 421 F.3d 199, 207-208 (3d Cir. 2005); 
Dam Things From Denmark v. Russ Berrie & Co., 290 F.3d 548, 562 (3d 
Cir. 2002). Further, 
[t]he plaintiff must prove both that the defendant copied the 
protected work and that there is substantial similarity between 
the two works. If there is no direct evidence of copying, 
copying must be shown by proving access and substantial 
similarity. Thus, as in some other courts, the term “substantial 
similarity” has two meanings in the Third Circuit . . . . As in 
the Second Circuit, substantial similarity that proves copying 
means that there is sufficient similarity between the two works 
in question to conclude that the accused infringer used the 
copyrighted work in making his work. Substantial similarity that 
proves unlawful appropriation means that the accused infringer 
took a significant portion of the independent work of the 
copyright owner that is entitled to the statutory protection. 
OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:1.1, at 3-3. 
86 Dam Things, 290 F.3d at 552. 
87 See Dam Things, 290 F.3d at 562 (stating that the fact-finder from the 
perspective of the lay observer must determine whether the copying was an 
unlawful appropriation of the copyrighted work); see also Universal Athletic 
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In Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, the Third Circuit 
evaluated substantial similarity by recording the court’s 
“impressions as they would appear to a layman viewing the two 
[works] side by side . . . concentrat[ing] upon the gross features 
rather than an examination of the minutiae.”88 The court 
examined the plaintiff’s wall chart for use with plaintiff’s weight 
lifting machine and the allegedly infringing chart of the 
defendant’s and discussed the most obvious differences 
(including color and arrangement) and similarities (including the 
use of stick figures and their corresponding positions of the 
figures for each exercise).89 The court ultimately reached the 
conclusion that a lay observer could not find substantial 
similarity between the two charts because while the ideas were 
similar, the expressions were not substantially so.90
The Third Circuit, employs a special test for computer 
programs, which has not been extended beyond computer related 
cases.91 This modified test permits a single substantial similarity 
inquiry whereby both the ordinary lay observer analysis and 
expert testimony are considered.92 In allowing this contravention 
of previously articulated law of the circuit, the court reasoned 
that the “ordinary observer test, which was developed in case 
involving novels, plays, and paintings, and which does not 
permit expert testimony, is of doubtful value involving computer 
programs on account of the programs’ complexity and 
unfamiliarity to most members of the public.”93  
Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 907 (3d Cir. 1975) (articulating that “it 
must be shown that copying went so far as to constitute improper 
appropriation, the test being the response of the ordinary lay person.”). 
88 Id. at 908. 
89 Id. at 909. 
90 Id. 
91 OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:1.3, at 3-16. 
92 Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1232-33 (3d 
Cir. 1986) (holding that the court joins “the growing number of courts which 
do not apply the ordinary observer test in copyright cases involving 
exceptionally difficult materials, like computer programs, but instead adopt a 
single substantial similarity inquiry according to which both lay and expert 
testimony would be admissible.”). 
93 Id. at 1232 (citing Howard Root, Note, Copyright Infringement of 
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The Third Circuit’s approach highlights the inconsistencies 
with the substantial similarity doctrine and its application to 
different types of works. In addition to the problems articulated 
by the Third Circuit with applying the ordinary observer test to 
computer programs, this test is difficult to apply in other 
complex subject matters, for example where the lay public may 
not possess the specialized expertise to compare two similar 
musical arrangements.94
3.  The Fifth Circuit 
The Fifth Circuit follows the Second Circuit’s use of the 
ordinary observer test.95 The Fifth Circuit in Gen. Universal 
Sys., Inc. v. Lee, dismissed plaintiff’s copyright action against a 
defendant for infringement of plaintiff’s freight packaging 
software system.96 The court stated that in determining whether 
“the allegedly infringing work is substantially similar to 
protectible elements of the infringed work . . . [a] side-by-side 
comparison [is] made between the original and the copy to 
Computer Programs: A Modification of the Substantial Similarity Test, 68 
MINN. L. REV. 1264, 1285-88 (1984); Note, Copyright Infringement Actions: 
The Proper Role for Audience Reactions in Determining Substantial 
Similarity, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 385 (1981) (“criticizing lay observer standard 
when objects in question are intended for particular, identifiable audiences”). 
94 Abrams, supra note 74; see also Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 
905 F.2d 731, 737 (4th Cir. 1990) (stating that in order to “warrant 
departure from the lay characterization of the ordinary observer test, 
‘specialized expertise’ must go beyond mere differences in taste and instead 
must rise to the level of the possession of knowledge that the lay public 
lacks.”). 
95 OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:1.4, at 3-6. See also 
Positive Black Talk, Inc. v. Cash Money Records, Inc., 394 F.3d 357, 367-
68 (5th Cir. 2004); Gen. Universal Sys., Inc. v. Lee, 379 F.3d 131, 141-42 
(5th Cir. 2004); Bridgmon v. Array Sys. Corp., 325 F.3d 572, 576-77 (5th 
Cir. 2003). The Fifth Circuit’s substantial similarity inquiry follows the 
Second Circuit: “Fifth Circuit courts make the same distinction between 
probative and substantial similarity: access plus probative similarity leads to 
the inference of copying; copying plus substantial similarity equals 
infringement.” OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:1.4, at 3-6. 
96 Gen. Universal Sys., 379 F.3d at 145-46. 
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determine whether a layman would view the two works as 
‘substantially similar.’”97 Additionally, the court upheld the 
lower court’s granting of defendant’s summary judgment where 
the plaintiff “failed to attach any of its own source code to its 
summary judgment motion . . . . Without providing its own 
source code for comparison, [Plaintiff] did not satisfy the 
requirement that the infringed and infringing work be compared 
side-by-side.”98 Thus, a side-by-side comparison of the two 
works is mandatory; a plaintiff who does not or cannot produce 
the works to do this comparison, cannot prevail.99
As evidenced in Gen. Universal Sys., the side-by-side 
approach articulated by the Fifth Circuit has the potential to 
throw out of court possibly meritorious claims on the basis that 
the party cannot provide the alleged infringing work to do a 
side-by-side comparison.100 This seems an unduly unfair 
approach. 
4.  The Seventh Circuit 
The Seventh Circuit’s substantial similarity inquiry is similar 
to that of the Second Circuit (and the Fifth Circuit).101 The 
Seventh Circuit also uses the ordinary observer test to assess 
substantial similarity. The fact finder must determine “whether 
the accused work is so similar to the plaintiff’s work that an 
ordinary reasonable person would conclude that the defendant 
unlawfully appropriated the plaintiff’s protectible expression by 
97 Id. at 142 (quoting Creations Unlimited v. McCain, 112 F.3d 814, 816 
(5th Cir. 1997) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
98 Id. at 146. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:1.5, at 3-18; see also 
Wildlife Express Corp. v. Carol Wright Sales, Inc., 18 F.3d 502 (7th Cir. 
1994); Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 
614-615 (7th Cir. 1982). “Courts in the Seventh Circuit make a distinction 
between probative similarity, similarity that proves copying, and substantial 
similarity, similarity that proves unlawful appropriation.” OSTERBERG & 
OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:1.5, at 3-18. 
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taking material of substance and value.”102 The Seventh Circuit 
in Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., after 
conducting an “ocular comparison” found that defendant’s K.C. 
Munchkin audiovisual game captured the total concept and feel 
of plaintiff’s copyrighted PAC-MAN audiovisual game.103
Additionally, like the Fifth Circuit, courts in the Seventh 
Circuit conduct a side-by-side comparison of the two works.104 
Unlike the Fifth Circuit, a side-by-side comparison is permitted 
but is not mandatory.105 In Wildlife Express Corp. v. Carol 
Wright Sales, Inc. the Seventh Circuit upheld the district court’s 
determination that that there was substantial similarity between 
defendant’s Precious Pet Duffle bags and plaintiff’s Wildlife 
Critters bags to constitute infringement.106 The court, in addition 
to reviewing the findings of the district court, conducted a side-
by-side comparison of the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s bags, 
which both had animal heads and tails attached to the ends of the 
bags. The court concluded that the total concept and feel of the 
two works were substantially similar so as to constitute unlawful 
appropriation.107
102 Atari, 672 F.2d at 614. 
103 672 F.2d at 619-20. 
104 Wildlife Express, 18 F.3d at 507 n.1. The Seventh Circuit’s 
substantial similarity doctrine 
differs from that of many other circuits in that the Seventh 
Circuit has held that there is a range of protection for 
copyrighted works similar to the range of protection for 
trademarks in trademark law. Where idea and expression are 
indistinguishable in plaintiff’s work, plaintiff’s work is weak and 
protected only from identical copying or very close 
paraphrasing. As the work embodies more in the way of 
particularized expression, it becomes stronger and receives 
broader copyright protection. The other circuits that have 
sanctioned this trademark-law type range of protection are the 
First and Third Circuits. 
OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:1.5, at 3-20. 
105 Wildlife Express, 18 F.3d at 507 n. 1. 
106 Id. at 511. 
107 Id. at 510-11. 
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C.  The Ninth Circuit’s Extrinsic/Intrinsic Test 
The substantial similarity test in the Ninth Circuit is a two 
part analysis containing an extrinsic and an intrinsic 
component.108 First, courts examine the two works under the 
extrinsic test, which is objective in nature.109 The extrinsic 
analysis “depends not on the responses of the trier of fact, but 
on specific criteria which can be listed and analyzed.”110 In 
Shaw v. Lindheim, a writer of a television pilot script brought a 
copyright infringement action against another writer.111 The 
court articulated that rather than comparing the ideas contained 
in the two works, courts list the elements of the works and 
analyze whether there are similarities in the expression of those 
elements.112
When applying the extrinsic test, a court in the Ninth Circuit 
is instructed to “filter out and disregard the non-protectible 
elements in making its substantial similarity determination.”113 
This process is referred to as “analytical dissection”114 which 
108 See Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 2004). 
109 See Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding 
that the extrinsic part of the test is an objective analysis of expression).
110  Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 
562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977). When applying the extrinsic test, when 
looking at literary works, district courts in the Ninth Circuit are instructed to 
compare “not the basic plot ideas for stories, but the actual concrete elements 
that make up the total sequence of events and the relationships between the 
major characters.” Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1985).
111 919 F.2d at 1353.
112 Id. at 1362. The elements that courts list and analyze are:
[f]or example, with respect to literary works, the elements are 
plot, themes, dialogue, mood, setting, pace, sequence of events, 
and characters. For works of visual art, the criterion includes 
shapes, colors, and arrangements of the representations in 
addition to the type of artwork involved, the materials used, the 
subject matter, and the setting for the subject. 
OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:2.1, at 3-23. 
113 Cavalier v. Random House Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 822 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(citing Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1361).
114 Swirsky, 376 F.3d at 845. 
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involves breaking works down into their constituent elements 
and comparing those elements to determine whether the 
similarities that exist are in the unprotectible elements (for 
example ideas or scenes a faire115).116  
It is important to note that while individual elements may not 
be protectible, a court can still find that the combination of those 
elements (selection, coordination, and arrangement), can be 
protectible.117 In Shaw, the court compared “the individual 
features of the works to find specific similarities between the 
plot, theme, dialogue, mood, setting, pace, characters, and 
sequence of events.”118 Ultimately, the court found that the 
objective similarities in protected expression under the extrinsic 
test were present and concluded that the plaintiff presented a 
triable issue of fact regarding the substantial similarity of the 
two works.119
The intrinsic test, which examines an ordinary person’s 
subjective impressions of the similarities between two works, is 
exclusively a question that is left to the jury.120 Once the court 
in Shaw made the determination that extrinsic similarities were 
present, the court reversed the district court’s granting of 
summary judgment to allow the fact finder to determine whether 
intrinsic similarities existed between the two works.121
115 See Cavalier, 297 F.3d at 815 (defining scenes a faire as “situations 
and incidents that flow necessarily or naturally from a basic plot premise.”). 
116 See OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:2.1, 3-23 (stating 
that “[b]ecause similarities in elements that are not protectible cannot count in 
the plaintiff’s favor in the infringement analysis, they are filtered out in the 
extrinsic analysis and not considered as part of the intrinsic analysis.”). 
117 Id. at 3-24 (citing Metcalf v. Bochco, 294 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2002)) 
(noting that the court in Metcalf “held that even though the elements common 
to both plaintiff’s screenplay and defendant’s television series were not 
individually copyrightable, Metcalf passed the extrinsic test because his 
combination of unprotectible items was copyrightable.”). 
118 919 F.2d at 1362 (citing Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 912 (9th 
Cir. 1989); Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir. 1985)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
119 Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1362-64.
120 See id. at 1360-61.
121 Id. at 1364.
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The intrinsic test is a subjective evaluation of whether there 
is substantial similarity in expressions depending on the response 
of the ordinary reasonable observer.122 Expert testimony is not 
permitted in the analysis on the intrinsic portion of the test.123 
This structure presents challenges for the fact finder because the 
fact finder is permitted to consider expert testimony when 
evaluating extrinsic similarities but, having been exposed to that 
testimony, is required to disregard it when evaluating similarities 
on the intrinsic portion of the test.124
The use of experts on the substantial similarity analysis is 
one point in particular where the circuits are divergent and thus 
potentially provide disparate results depending on the plaintiff’s 
forum choice. For example, in contrast to the Second Circuit, 
the Ninth Circuit allows the use of expert testimony in assessing 
substantial similarity (on the extrinsic portion of the test). Under 
the “ordinary observer” test adopted by the Second Circuit, the 
determination of “illicit copying (unlawful appropriation) . . . is 
the response of the ordinary lay [observer]; accordingly, on that 
issue, dissection and expert testimony are irrelevant.”125
It has been argued that expert witnesses can provide 
information that the judge, or the “ordinary observer, who may 
not be entirely familiar with literary works or how to identify 
scenes a faire cannot.”126According to Nimmer: 
[T]here will . . . be numerous instances when the 
“ordinary observer” is simply not capable of 
detecting very real appropriation . . . if the 
[defendant’s work] consists merely of clever 
juxtaposition and alteration of unessential details in 
the plaintiff’s work, plus the addition of a substantial 
122 See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s 
Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977). 
123 See id. 
124 OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 16.1 at 16-4. 
125 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
126 Nimmer § 13.03[E][3][a] (stating that “it is hardly reasonable to 
expect laymen . . . to delineate the portion of the plaintiff’s work that it is 
protectible” on their own). 
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amount of new material so that the resulting product 
is unrecognizable by the untutored observer in his 
immediate and spontaneous impression, should it be 
said, as a matter of law, that no piracy has occurred? 
Such a principle renders the fruits of a writer’s labor 
safe from all but the clever thieves.127
Arguably, expert testimony should apply in these contexts 
where courts must consider whether, for example, the character 
traits in a movie are drawn from a specific work or are instead 
part of a stock type, or whether a particular plot twist is scenes-
a-faire or evidence of copying.128 These determinations are 
difficult for non-experts to make without knowledge of the 
context that surrounds the two works—experts could supply 
these answers.129 Accordingly, the use of expert testimony in 
this context could aid in a more consistent determination of 
similarities of expression. 
The extrinsic/intrinsic test has been widely criticized even by 
the very court that created it.130 The major criticism of the test 
is that it is hard to understand and not easy to apply.131 The 
Ninth Circuit has recognized the difficulties of applying the test 
and in Metcalf v. Bochco, described the extrinsic test as “turbid 
waters.”132 Moreover, in Swirsky v. Carey, the court noted that 
“[t]he application of the extrinsic test, which assesses substantial 
similarity of ideas and expression, to musical compositions is a 
somewhat unnatural task, guided by relatively little precedent . . 
. . The extrinsic test provides an awkward framework to apply 
to copyrighted works like music or art objects, which lack 
distinct element of ideas and expression.”133 But, the court went 
127 Nimmer § 13.03 [E][2]. 
128 See Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(allowing expert testimony on plot); Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 848 
(9th Cir. 2004) (reversing defendant’s summary judgment motion because 
expert affidavit created issue of material fact on stock elements). 
129 See Nimmer § 13.03[E][3][a]. 
130 See Swirsky, 376 F.3d at 848. 
131 OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:2.1 at 3-29. 
132 294 F.3d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 2002). 
133 376 F.3d at 848. 
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on to conclude: “the test is our law and we must apply it.”134
In addition to the problems discussed by the Ninth Circuit 
itself, the extrinsic/intrinsic test clouds the distinction between 
ideas and expression and makes it difficult to apply to certain 
types of works. For example, it may be very difficult to separate 
out ideas from expressions when comparing two paintings or 
other visual art works. Similarly, this test does easily translate to 
complex, technical subject matter as may be found in computer 
or music cases. 
Additionally, it is should be noted that even though the Ninth 
Circuit purports to break the issue up into an objective and 
subjective analysis, in reality, it is possible that judges even in 
the Ninth Circuit continue to make subjective decisions on 
summary judgment, and thus on a portion of the test that is 
supposed to be purely objective. For instance, if on summary 
judgment the judge is determining whether extrinsic similarities 
exist between the two works, the obvious question becomes: 
how many similarities have to be present to send it to the jury? 
The jurisprudence in the Ninth Circuit does not provide a bright 
line rule to answer this question. Thus, a judge looking at two 
works will at some level be making a subjective determination 
of how many extrinsic similarities are too many. Would one 
similarity be enough? Two? Ten? Where does a judge draw the 
line? This flaw presents a major difficulty for courts and has the 
potential to produce unreliable and unpredictable precedent. 
D.  Circuits That Follow the Ninth Circuit’s 
Extrinsic/Intrinsic Test 
1.  The Fourth Circuit 
The Fourth Circuit uses a version of the Ninth Circuit’s 
extrinsic/intrinsic test to compare works.135 In Towler v. Sayles, 
134 Id. 
135 OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:2.2, at 3-29; see also 
Lyons P’ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 801 (4th Cir. 
2001); Towler v. Sayles, 76 F.3d 579, 583 (4th Cir. 1996); Dawson v. 
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the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that 
defendant’s screenplay was not substantially similar to plaintiff’s 
copyrighted screenplay.136 The court articulated that proving 
substantial similarity requires a two part analysis.137 On the 
extrinsic portion of the Fourth Circuit’s test, “a plaintiff must 
show—typically with the aid of expert testimony—that the works 
in question are extrinsically similar because they contain 
substantially similar ideas that are subject to copyright 
protection.”138 The court analyzed the similarities in plot, 
theme, mood, dialogue, setting, and pace between the two 
screenplays and determined that the works were not extrinsically 
similar because the only extrinsic similarity was that they both 
had a black female character and white female charter who were 
friends.139
To satisfy the intrinsic portion of the Fourth Circuit’s test, a 
plaintiff must “[show] substantial similarity in how those ideas 
are expressed” by considering whether the intended audience 
would consider the works substantially similar.140 Expert 
testimony is usually not permissible on the intrinsic portion 
which compares the “total concept and feel” of the two works 
and considers “whether the intended audience could determine 
that the works are substantially similar.”141 In Towler, the court 
determined that the intended audience was the movie-going 
public and that the works were not intrinsically similar because 
the total concept and feel of the two works was completely 
Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 732-33 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 
498 U.S. 981 (1990); Eaton v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 972 F.Supp. 1019 (E.D. 
Va. 1997), aff’d, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10288 (4th Cir. May 21, 1998). 
136 76 F.3d at 583. 
137 Id. at 583-84. 
138 Id. (For example, in comparing two screenplays, a court “must 
analyze both screenplays and the record, searching for extrinsic similarities 
such as those found in plot, theme, dialogue, mood, setting, pace, or 
sequence.”). 
139 Id. at 584. 
140 Id. at 583-84. 
141 Id. at 584. 
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different.142
The major difference between the Ninth Circuit and the 
Fourth Circuit tests is that the Fourth Circuit utilizes the 
“intended audience” test rather than an ordinary observer test to 
determine whether the works are intrinsically similar.143 This 
was demonstrated in Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., where the 
Fourth Circuit held that 
[I]f, as will most often be the case, the lay public 
fairly represents the intended audience, the court 
should apply the lay observer formulation . . . . 
However, if the intended audience is more narrow in 
that it possesses specialized expertise, relevant to the 
purchasing decision, that lay people would lack, the 
court’s inquiry should focus on whether a member of 
the intended audience would find that two works to 
be substantially similar.144
The Fourth Circuit includes in this inquiry the “admission of 
testimony from members of the intended audience, or, possibly, 
from those who possess expertise with reference to the tastes 
and perceptions of the intended audience.”145
Two prominent copyright scholars, Robert C. Osterberg and 
Eric C. Osterberg noted the following advantages and 
disadvantages of the intended audience test: 
The intended audience test offers the obvious 
142  Towler v. Sayles, 76 F.3d 579, 584 (4th Cir. 1996) 
143 OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:2.2, at 3-30. 
Osterberg and Osterberg noted that currently, “the Fourth Circuit’s intended 
audience test is the minority approach. Other than . . . exceptions . . . with 
respect to children’s works and computer programs, most courts seem to 
require that works be compared by the ordinary observer, that is, jurors with 
no specialized training or expertise, in all instances.” Id. at 3-36. 
144 Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 736 (4th Cir. 1990), 
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981. 
145 Id. Nevertheless, the court in Dawson cautioned that “a court should 
be hesitant to find that the lay public does not fairly represent a work’s 
intended audience . . . departure from the lay characterization is warranted 
only where the intended audience possesses ‘specialized expertise.’” Id. at 
737. 
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advantage of evaluation of the works through the eyes 
of those who understand them best. On the other 
hand, to apply the intended audience test, the court 
must both identify the intended audience and either 
select only members of that audience for its jury or 
accept expert testimony concerning the intended 
audience’s reaction, potentially yielding the fact-
finding function to the expert.146
Thus, while the intended audience test attempts to address 
the root purposes of copyright law it does not provide a suitable 
framework that would be applicable to all cases where the issue 
is whether two works are substantially similar. For example, this 
test would be problematic where a work has many intended 
audiences or if the intended audience could not be identified.147
Additionally, as discussed later in this Note, providing 
authors with the economic incentive to create work is not the 
only factor that must be considered. One must consider the 
alternative that an increase in the number of works that can be 
protected causes a shrinking of the public domain which has the 
potential to stifle creativity.148 If protection is afforded to a work 
because the allegedly infringing work could have an effect on 
the original author’s market, there is the potential that people 
will be less inclined to building upon and use other’s works for 
fear of being held liable.149 This would be bad for society 
because, potentially, less works would be created.150
2.  The Eighth Circuit 
The Eighth Circuit also uses a version of the 
extrinsic/intrinsic test of the Ninth Circuit.151 The Eighth 
146 OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:2.2, at 3-36. 
147 See id. 
148 See Mohler, supra note 8, at 974. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:2.3, at 3-37; see also 
Taylor Corp. v. Four Seasons Greetings, LLC, 403 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 
2005); Moore v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 972 F.2d 939, 945 (8th Cir. 
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Circuit’s test is described by the court in Hartman v. Hallmark 
Cards, Inc. as follows: “First, similarity of ideas is analyzed 
extrinsically, focusing on objective similarities in the details of 
the works. Second, if there is substantial similarity in ideas, 
similarity of expression is evaluated using an intrinsic test 
depending on the response of the ordinary, reasonable person as 
to the forms of expression.”152 On the intrinsic portion of the 
test, the question is whether the ordinary, reasonable observer 
would find substantial similarity of expression.153 Accordingly, 
expert testimony is permitted only on the extrinsic portion of the 
test, and may not be utilized for the intrinsic test.154
In Hartman, the plaintiff asserted that defendants Hallmark 
and Mattel used plaintiff’s graphics and script entitled “The 
Adventures of Rainbow Island” as the basis for their “Rainbow 
Brite” character and products.155 The Eighth Circuit upheld the 
district court’s grant of summary judgment which found, when it 
analyzed the two works extrinsically and focused on the 
objective similarities in the works, that the plaintiff’s work 
consisted almost completely of uncopyrightable ideas or general 
themes.156 On the intrinsic portion of the test, the court 
examined the district court’s comparison of the total concept and 
feel of the two works and concluded that the two creations were 
not substantially similar in expression.157
1992); Hartman v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 833 F.2d 117, 120 (8th Cir. 1987). 
Both the Eighth Circuit and the Fourth Circuit, use a version of the Ninth 
Circuit’s extrinsic/intrinsic test that comes from Ninth Circuit cases that were 
decided in the years between Krofft and the re-articulated objective/subjective 
test from Shaw. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:2.3, at 3-37. 
152 Hartman, 833 F.2d at 120. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 119. 
156 Id. at 121. 
157 Id. at 120-21. 
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E.  The Remaining Circuits 
The remaining circuits utilize a variety of tests to assess 
substantial similarity. The Tenth Circuit, Sixth Circuit, and the 
D.C. Circuit, use the abstraction-filtration-comparison test, or a 
version thereof.158 The Eleventh Circuit primarily uses the 
ordinary observer test, but occasionally uses the 
extrinsic/intrinsic test.159
1.  The Tenth Circuit 
The Tenth Circuit uses the abstraction-filtration-comparison 
test for various types of infringement cases, including computer 
cases.160 The Tenth Circuit, in Country Kids ‘N City Slicks, Inc. 
v. Sheen, applied the abstraction-filtration-comparison test to 
determine whether allegedly infringing wooden dolls were 
substantially similar to the protectible elements of the plaintiff’s 
copyrighted dolls.161
The court described the test as follows: 
At the abstraction step, we separate the ideas (and 
basic utilitarian functions) which are not protectible, 
from the particular expression of the work. Then, we 
filter out the nonprotectible components of the 
product from the original expression. Finally, we 
compare the remaining protected elements to the 
allegedly copied work to determine if the two works 
158 OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3, at 3-2; see also 
Hartman, 833 F.2d at 120-21. 
159  OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3, at 3-2. 
160 Id. at § 3:3.1, at 3-39; see also Country Kids ‘N City Slicks, Inc. v. 
Sheen, 77 F.3d 1280, 1284 (10th Cir. 1996); Kindergartners Count, Inc. v. 
DeMoulin, 249 F.Supp. 2d 1214 (D. Kan. 2003); Madrid Chronicle Books, 
209 F.Supp. 2d 1227 (D.Wyo. 2002); Fisher v. United Feature Sydicate, 
Inc., 37 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (D. Colo. 1999), aff’d. 203 F.3d 834 (10th Cir. 
2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 992 (2000). 
161 77 F.3d at 1284. 
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are substantially similar.162
The court utilized this test to determine that the size, shape, 
and medium of the plaintiff’s dolls were unprotectible elements 
and thus must be filtered out.163 Nevertheless, the court 
remanded the case to the district court to conduct a comparison 
analysis.164 The court further articulated that the ordinary 
observer test is the appropriate method for courts to use on the 
comparison analysis.165
Like both the extrinsic/intrinsic test and the ordinary 
observer test, this test is problematic for many of the same 
reasons. The process that this test requires is very similar to the 
extrinsic/intrinsic test and the ordinary observer test that asks 
courts to separate out ideas from expressions.166 Similar to those 
tests, this test does not provide much guidance on how to do so 
and offers little direction to answer the ultimate question of 
whether a work has been improperly appropriated. 
2.  The Sixth Circuit 
The Sixth Circuit, in Kohus v. Mariol,167 recently adopted a 
test for assessing substantial similarity that appears to be a 
version of the abstraction-filtration-comparison test.168 Previous 
to Kohus, the Sixth Circuit had not adopted a specific test for 
assessing substantial similarity in a copyright infringement 
case.169 Kohus involved the alleged infringement of plaintiff’s 
162 Id. at 1284-85. 
163 Id. at 1287. 
164 Id. at 1288. 
165 Id. 
166 See id. at 1285. 
167 328 F.3d 848 (6th Cir. 2003). 
168 OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:3.2, at 3-43. 
169 OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:3.2, at 3-42; see also 
Kohus, 328 F.3d at 854 (6th Cir. 2003); Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 
384 F.3d 283 (6th Cir. 2004); Ellis v. Diffie, 177 F.3d 503, 506 (6th Cir. 
1999) (court utilized the ordinary observer test without the aid of expert 
testimony); Bird Brain, Inc. v. Menard, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11668 
(W.D. Mich. Aug. 4, 2000) (utilizing the ordinary observer test in assessing 
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copyrighted drawing of a portable children’s playyard latch by 
defendant’s patent drawings for a collapsible playyard.170  
The court in Kohus, adopted a two part test.171 In the first 
step, courts are supposed to “filter out the unoriginal, 
unprotectible elements—elements that were not independently 
created by the inventor, and that possess no minimal degree of 
creativity—through a variety of analyses.”172 Expert testimony is 
permissible on the first step.173 Next, “[o]nce the unprotectible 
elements have been filtered out, the second step is to determine 
whether the allegedly infringing work is substantially similar to 
the protectible elements of the original.”174 The court looked to 
the Fourth Circuit case, Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., to 
hold that “the inquiry in the second prong of the substantial 
similarity test should focus on the intended audience.”175  
substantial similarity without the use of experts); Marigold Foods, Inc. v. 
Purity Dairies, Inc., 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14044 (6th Cir. June 10, 1992) 
(district court used the extrinsic/intrinsic test and the court of appeals used 
the same test). 
170 328 F.3d at 851-52. 
171 Id. at 855. 
172 Id. (citations omitted). “The court specifically identified ideas, 
elements dictated by efficiency, and scenes a faire as elements to be filtered 
out before comparing works. In a later case . . . the court added another item 
to the list of elements to be filtered—independently-created elements.” 
OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:3.2, at 3-43 – 3-44. 
173 See Kohus, 328 F.3d at 856 (The court stated that on the first step, 
“[i]n the present case expert testimony will likely be required to establish 
what elements, if any, are necessary to the function of any latch designed for 
the upper arm of a collapsible playyard.”). 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 856-57 (citing Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 
736 (4th Cir. 1990) (emphasis in original) (holding that [i]n cases where the 
target audience possesses specialized expertise, however, the specialist’s 
perception of similarity may be much different from the lay observer’s, and it 
is appropriate in such cases to consider similarity from the specialist’s 
perspective . . . . [T]he intended audience . . . will ordinarily be the lay 
public, in which case the finder of fact’s judgment should be from the 
perspective of the lay observer or . . . the ordinary reasonable person. But in 
cases where the audience for the work possesses specialized expertise that is 
relevant to the purchasing decision and lacking in the lay observer, the trier 
of fact should make the substantial similarity determination from the 
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The court remanded the case to permit expert testimony on 
the first prong, because the drawings were “technical in nature 
and a lay person is unlikely to understand what constitutes 
creativity in this area, which elements are standard for the 
industry, and which elements are dictated by efficiency or by 
external standards.”176 Additionally, the court directed that in 
examining the second prong of the test, substantial similarity 
should be analyzed from the viewpoint of the intended audience, 
noting that in this case the intended audience may not be the lay 
public, but rather trained engineers.177
This test varies from the abstraction/filtration/comparison 
test because it at least provides some guidance with regards to 
from whose viewpoint the comparison should be done. Here, the 
comparison is done from the intended audience’s viewpoint. 
While this test clarifies that point, it does not solve any of the 
previously articulated problems. Additionally, conducting the 
comparison from the intended audience perspective has the 
positives and negatives previously discussed (e.g. what happens 
when the intended audiences are not the same?).178
3.  The District of Columbia Circuit 
The District of Columbia Circuit uses the ordinary observer 
test in some cases and the filtration/comparison inquiry in other 
cases.179 In cases where the defendant does not claim that the 
plaintiff’s work is composed of non-copyrightable elements, the 
                                                          
perspective of the intended audience.). 
176 Id. at 857-58. 
177 Id. at 858. 
178 See OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:2.2, at 3-36; see 
also Section III.D.1 of this Note. 
179 OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:3.3, at 3-46; see also 
Atkins v. Fischer, 331 F.3d 988, 993 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (utilizing the ordinary 
observer test for assessing substantial similarity); Whitehead v. CBS/Viacom, 
Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8-9 (D.D.C. 2004) (utilizing the ordinary observer 
test); Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 281 F.3d 1287, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 
2002) (utilizing a two-step filtration/comparison inquiry). 
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D.C. Circuit applies the ordinary observer test.180 But, in cases 
where the defendant argues that plaintiff’s work contains 
portions that are not protected by copyright, the D.C. Circuit 
conducts a two-step filtration/comparison inquiry.181 First, the 
court identifies “which aspects of the artist’s work, if any are 
protectible by copyright,”182 filtering out “unprotectible 
elements such as ideas and scenes a faire.”183 Next, the court 
uses the ordinary observer test to determine “whether the 
allegedly infringing work is substantially similar to the 
protectible elements of the artist’s work.”184
4.  The Eleventh Circuit 
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit, primarily uses the ordinary 
observer test to assess substantial similarity, but has occasionally 
used the extrinsic/intrinsic test as well.185 In Suntrust Bank v. 
Houghton Mifflin Co., the Eleventh Circuit held that in order to 
show substantial similarity, plaintiff was required to show that 
“an average lay observer would recognize the alleged copy as 
having been appropriated from the copyrighted work.”186 
 Suntrust Bank involved an attempt by owners of copyright in 
the novel “Gone with the Wind” to obtain a temporary 
restraining order and preliminary injunction to prevent the 
                                                          
180 See Atkins, 331 F.3d 988; Whitehead, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1. 
181 See e.g., Sturdza, 281 F.3d at 1295. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. at 1296. 
184 Id. (holding that in using the ordinary observer test the determination 
“requires comparison not only of the two works’ individual elements in 
isolation, but also of their overall look and feel.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
185 OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:4, at 3-48; see also 
Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co, 268 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th Cir. 
2001) (utilizing the ordinary observer test to assess substantial similarity); 
Leigh v. Warner Bros., Inc., 212 F.3d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 2000) (utilizing 
the ordinary observer test to assess substantial similarity); Herzog v. Castle 
Rock Entm’t, 193 F.3d 1241, 1248 (11th Cir. 1999) (the Eleventh Circuit 
utilized the extrinsic/intrinsic test of the Ninth Circuit). 
186 268 F.3d at 1266. 
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publication and distribution of the allegedly infringing book 
“The Wind Done Gone.” After conducting a comparison of the 
two works, the Court affirmed the district court’s finding that 
the defendant copied much more of plaintiff’s work than just 
unprotectible scenes-a-faire including the characters and their 
complex relationships with each other, plot, fictional locales, 
and settings.187
In contrast, in Herzog v. Castle Rock, Entm’t the Eleventh 
Circuit utilized a two-part test for establishing substantial 
similarity.188 The court articulated that the plaintiff must satisfy 
both the extrinsic, or objective test and the intrinsic, or 
subjective test. Herzog involved a claim by the plaintiff that 
defendant’s motion picture entitled “Loan Star” infringed 
plaintiff’s copyrighted screenplay entitled “Concealed.”189 The 
court conducted an analysis of the two works and held that the 
similarities that existed between the two works consisted of 
noncopyrightable elements and that no reasonable juror could 
find that the two works were substantially similar in 
expression.190
IV.  RECOMMENDATION FOR THE FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT LAW 
The attempts by courts to articulate and redefine tests in 
hopes of eliminating confusion have in fact resulted in more 
confusion and ambiguity about what the test for substantial 
similarity should be.191 Instead of trying to wade through the 
confusing array of tests available or attempting to articulate a 
single test, courts should articulate a standard that goes to the 
ultimate purpose of copyright. In order to determine if there has 
been copyright infringement a court should determine whether or 
not providing relief for the owner of the copyright will enhance 
the policy goals of copyright and the objectives of Congress. 
                                                          
187 Id. at 1266-67. 
188 193 F.3d at 1257. 
189 Id. at 1243. 
190 Id. at 1262. 
191 Mohler, supra note 8, at 990. 
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The tests that have been discussed throughout this Note are 
looking at the issue in the wrong way. The majority of circuit 
courts discussed incorporate some form of ordinary observer test 
into their substantial similarity formula. Making the important 
decision of substantial similarity based on the perception of the 
ordinary observer is looking at the issue from not only an 
unclear and ambiguous perspective, but is also misguided. 
Rather, courts should be considering the issue in order to 
determine how much copying is too much based on the policy 
and aims of the Copyright statute. 
In Mazer v. Stein, the Supreme Court stated that  
[t]he economic philosophy behind the clause 
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights 
is the conviction that encouragement of individual 
effort by personal gain is the best way to advance 
public welfare through the talents of authors and 
inventors in “Science and the useful Arts.” Sacrificial 
days devoted to such creative activities deserve 
rewards commensurate with the services rendered.192
The main problem with this theory is that it does not adequately 
address the potential effect that looking at the issue from an 
economic perspective would have on creativity. The opposite 
side to this economic perspective is the notion that granting an 
author a monopoly for a period also prevents people from 
expanding and creating new works based on old works.193 Thus, 
findings of infringement should be limited in an effort to 
promote the production of creative works and to promote a 
robust public domain. 
Many legal scholars have weighed in on the various tests for 
assessing substantial similarity in a copyright infringement action 
and have attempted to bring clarity to this confusing and 
unpredictable area of the law by articulating new tests and ways 
to view copyright infringement cases.194
192 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) 
193 See Busek, supra note 10, at 1777-78; see also Mohler, supra note 8, 
at 974. 
194 Stanfield, supra note 4, at 510-11. 
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Michael Sharb suggested a redefined total concept and feel 
test that consisted of five steps.195 Sharb’s redefined test 
proposed an adoption of the total concept and feel test as “the 
uniform test of substantial similarity of expression” and “the 
intended audience test as the uniform test of perspective in the 
total concept and feel inquiry.”196
The argument against Sharb’s redefined test is that it “relies 
upon other tests to determine the line between idea and 
expression, and the ordinary observer test to assess whether 
similarity is substantial.”197 Thus, the same problems articulated 
above that arise with the idea/expression dichotomy and the 
ordinary observer test, especially when it comes to technical and 
complex works will inevitably be problematic in this redefined 
test. 
Jarrod Mohler suggested that one “over-arching and flexible 
test” does not exist.198 He concluded that “the ‘abstractions’ 
framework from Nichols v. Universal Picture Corp. is sufficient 
to assist the trier of fact, and that the use of other tests for 
substantial similarity is unnecessary and positively harmful.”199 
Mohler suggests that the use of these other tests is harmful 
because they are often inconsistently and misapplied, thus 
leading to a great amount of confusion for courts and 
195 Michael L. Sharb, Comment, Getting a “Total Concept and Feel” of 
Copyright Infringement, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 903, 929 (1993). The five part 
test requires: 
1) does the plaintiff have a valid copyright? 2) did the defendant 
copy from the plaintiff? 3) is what the defendant copied from the 
plaintiff an unprotectible idea or protectible expression? 4) if 
expression was copied, does it constitute improper 
appropriation, or, in other words, are the works substantially 
similar (the original source of the [total concept and feel] test) 
and 5) from whose perspective should the substantial similarity 
inquiry be made. 
Id. at 920. 
196 Id. at 923. 
197 Stanfield, supra note 4, at 510. 
198 Mohler, supra note 8, at 989. 
199 Id. at 972, citing 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930). 
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commentators.200 While it is apparent that one single test does 
not exist, the ‘abstractions’ framework that requires line drawing 
between ideas and expressions still provides little guidance and 
is problematic for courts.201
Jeannette Rene Busek addressed the difficulties that courts 
have in applying the current tests to a variety of works when she 
suggested that courts should “consider the type of work in 
question, using it as a base for the standard of substantial 
similarity.”202 Busek argued that  
[i]nstead of trying to fit all copyright infringement 
cases into neat tests that are independent of the 
amount of expressive variation possible, courts would 
be better off recognizing the vast differences between 
the types of works covered by copyright law and 
articulating their decisions based on the amount of 
expressive variation available to the particular type of 
work.203
This approach addresses the problems associated with the 
current tests in dealing with a variety of types of works. The 
difficulty with this proposal is that it also requires courts to 
make difficult determinations between what constitutes an idea 
and what constitutes an expression of an idea. Courts are asked 
to determine whether in a particular type of work there are 
many expressive variations. This seems similar to how a court 
would be required to distinguish between ideas and expressions 
under the abstractions test analysis. 
A few commentators and courts have suggested a test or 
approach that looks at the market for which the original work 
was intended. For example, Edward Wilde proposed that courts 
replace the idea/expression dichotomy with a market-based 
analysis.204 Wilde argued that the idea/expression terminology 
200 Mohler, supra note 8, at 971. 
201 COHEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 80. 
202 Busek, supra note 10, at 1778. 
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traditionally used by courts “does not work well and it does not 
address the root purpose of copyright law.”205 Instead, Wilde 
suggested that the courts should analyze the market for each 
work and “determine whether the copied similarities in the 
second work are such that the second work can substitute for the 
first work or otherwise usurp the proper market position of the 
first work. If the two works will compete as separate products, 
then there is no wrongful infringement.”206 
Additionally, Michael Der Manuelian in criticizing the 
ordinary observer test, articulated that “[i]f, as Arnstein 
suggested, copyright law should protect the plaintiff’s interest in 
potential financial returns, the ultimate test for infringement 
should consider specifically the response of the market from 
which those returns would derive.”207 Similarly, Professor 
Nimmer has argued that copyright is intended “to protect writers 
from the theft of the fruits of their labor, not to protect against 
the general public’s “spontaneous and immediate” impression 
that the fruits have been stolen.”208 In his criticism of the 
ordinary observer or average lay hearer test, Der Manuelian 
continued: “an average lay hearer may not be qualified to 
determine the responses of the particular audience for whom the 
music has been composed . . . . Finally, the ‘lay-hearer test’ 
may promote findings of infringement based on overall 
similarities which, in fact, may be attributable, not to copying, 
but to common sources or genuine coincidence.”209
While a market based analysis is less confusing than the tests 
currently available and attempts to address the underlying 
purpose of copyright law, courts must be conscious of the 
shrinking public domain and the effect that this has on the 
proliferation of new creations.210 The Framers of the 
REV. 793 (1995). 
205 Id. at 794. 
206 Id. at 841. 
207 Der Manuelian, supra note 70, at 144-45 (citing Arnstein v. Porter, 
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Constitution authorized the creation of Federal Copyright Law in 
order to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”211 
Thus, the purpose of copyright law is to promote, not restrain, 
creativity in the arts. 
It is clearly the case that courts have expanded the scope of 
the protection of the reproduction right.212 Authors increasingly 
get the right to prevent people from copying their works in more 
and more ways.213
In recent years . . . an increasing number of trivial 
copyright violations have made it to court . . . . This 
increase in litigation of trivial copyright violations is 
problematic . . . [because] strict enforcement of 
copyright for trivial violations rarely furthers, and 
often contravenes, the purpose of copyright: 
promotion of creativity . . . [and] courts have not 
taken a consistent approach to adjudicating trivial 
violations: a few hold that liability extends even to 
the most innocuous violations, while most find a way 
to privilege trivial violations using one of several 
doctrinal tools. Unfortunately, these tools, most 
notably . . . substantial similarity, [have] at times 
been stretched beyond recognition to achieve the 
courts’ desired results.214
It is important to consider whether as copyright protection 
gets more and more protective, there is the potential to stifle 
creativity.  
After conducting an examination of the myriad of confusing 
tests and recommendations for new tests, this Note asks the 
question: Do we really need a test at all?  
Ultimately, courts should not employ any of the articulated 
tests and instead should engage in a weighing of the goals of 
copyright to determine whether a finding of infringement would 
211 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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“strike the optimal balance between providing authors with 
incentives to create and encouraging dissemination of works and 
information to the public.”215 In order to achieve this goal, 
courts must ultimately attempt “to balance the needs of existing 
authors for protection with needs of future authors to use the 
ideas and other raw materials need to create.”216
CONCLUSION 
Due to the present state of uncertainty and confusion 
surrounding substantial similarity in a copyright infringement 
action, we are moving further and further away from a uniform 
copyright law. The Supreme Court needs to articulate a standard 
that would resolve this split in the circuits. 
The conflict within the Circuits has lasted for many years 
and does not seem to show any signs of diminishing. The 
outcome of many copyright infringement cases comes down to 
whether or not two works are substantially similar. Under the 
current state of affairs, there is a great chance that litigants will 
forum shop for a Circuit that is friendly to plaintiffs in copyright 
infringement suits. There should be a single uniform standard 
articulated by the Supreme Court because copyright is a federal 
law. Thus, it is critical that the Supreme Court resolve this issue 
so that the outcome of each case dealing with substantial 
similarity under the Federal Copyright Act does not come down 
to where the case was filed. 
This Note argues that when courts analyze substantial 
similarity, they are looking at the issue in the wrong way. When 
making the determination of whether someone ought to be able 
to bring a copyright infringement claim, it is necessary to look 
at why the Constitution affords copyright protection. Currently, 
the tests do not adequately look at impact on creativity of 
industry. It is important to remember that “the purpose of 
copyright is to create incentives for creative effort”217 Instead of 
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focusing on the impact of creativity, court focus more on the 
potential harm to the plaintiff’s market, without considering need 
for the incentive. Courts should abandon the current tests and 
make their determinations of copyright infringement based on 
whether or not providing relief for the owner of the copyright 
will enhance the objectives that congress had in mind when they 
created a federal copyright law. Under such as approach, while 
the outcome of a particular case may be less predictable, 
litigants will be able to focus on the merits of the case rather 
than advocating for a particular test to be applied to the merits. 
Courts and advocates will no longer have to deliberate over 
ambiguous terms such as ordinary lay observer, intended 
audience, and extrinsic or intrinsic.218 
 
450 (1984). 
218 Sharb, supra note 195, at 929. 
